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Abstract. 
 The problem of the relation between Geometry and Physics has been 
the object of extensive discussions, through the present century, by 
mathematicians, physicists and philosophers of science, who have considered the 
possibility to decide which geometry corresponds to physical space, with respect 
to the General Theory of Relativity. At first sight, the Special Theory of Relativity 
seems to be independent from this problem.  
 In this debate, which made reference to Poincaré's philosophy of 
Geometry, Einstein has been directly involved. Although he concludes positively 
about the decidability of Geometry, he is not a rejoinder of empiricism. He 
himself invokes frequently Poincaré in his arguments against empiricists, in 
particular Poincaré's alleged "indissociability between Geometry and Physics", 
which sounds like Poincaré's indissociability between space and dynamics 
contrary to Einstein's separation of kinematics from dynamics in Special 
Relativity. It is thus tempting to compare his own position to Poincaré's one 
before and after his elaboration of the General Theory of Relativity. We would 
like to know, in particular, whether Einstein's conception of the relations between 
Geometry and Physics has drastically changed when he has passed from Special to 
General Theory of Relativity, adopting henceafter the essential of Poincaré's 
conception which he did not share at the time of Special Relativity. 
 This inquiry has led us to a reevaluation of Poincaré's conception of 
the relation between Geometry and Physics, quite at variance with the received 
view. It also has led us to consider again the problem of why Poincaré did not 
fully develop Special Relativity as we now understand it, i.e. in Einstein's sense, 
and to show evidence for a strong influence of his conception of Geometry when 
dealing with classical and relativistic Mechanics. Finally we show what has been 
actually - in our view - the evolution of Einstein's thought concerning the relations 
of Physics and Geometry, which is indeed an adaptation of his previous implicit 
conception, at work with Special Relativity, to the requirements of the general 
theory. This adaptation revealed to him the complexity of a problem he had 
considered previously in a simplified way, and made him conscious of the well-
foundedness of important aspects of Poincaré's conceptions, which he translated, 
then adapted, for the use of his own physical thinking.  
 
Résumé. 
 Le problème des relations entre la géométrie et la physique a fait 
l'objet de nombreuses discussions, tout au long de ce siècle, entre les 
mathématiciens, les physiciens et les philosophes des sciences. Ces discussions 
étaient centrées pour l'essentiel sur le problème de la décidabilité expérimentale 
de la géométrie, c'est-à-dire sur la possibilité, ou non, de décider de la géométrie 
qui correspond à l'espace du monde physique, en prenant en considération la 
théorie de la Relativité générale. La Relativité restreinte semble à première vue 
rester étrangère à ce problème. 
 Einstein a pris directement part à ce débat, dans lequel la philosophie 
de la géométrie de Poincaré était fréquemment invoquée. Lui-même y faisait 
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volontiers référence : tout en concluant à la possibilité de décider 
expérimentalement de la géométrie du monde physique, il s'opposait à 
l'empirisme et reprenait, dans son débat contre ce dernier, des arguments rapportés 
à Poincaré, comme celui de l'"indissociabilité de la géométrie et de la physique". 
Cette dernière n'est pas sans rappeler l'indissociabilité de l'espace et de la 
dynamique, qui marquent l'approche de la Relativité par Poincaré, au contraire de 
la séparation de la cinématique et de la dynamique opérée par Einstein pour 
parvenir à sa théorie de la Relativité restreinte. Il était tentant de comparer sa 
propre position, avant et après son élaboration de la Relativité générale, à celle de 
Poincaré. Il serait intéressant de savoir, en particulier, si la conception d'Einstein 
sur les relations entre la géométrie et la physique a radicalement changé quand il 
est passé de la Relativité restreinte à la Relativité générale, s'alignant purement et 
simplement, après cette dernière, sur la position de Poincaré, alors qu'il en 
différait à l'époque de la Relativité restreinte. 
 Cette enquête nous a conduit à remettre en question la description 
généralement admise des conceptions de Poincaré sur les rapports entre la 
géométrie et la physique. Nous avons également été amené à reprendre le 
problème de savoir pourquoi Poincaré n'a pas développé dans toutes ses 
implications la Relativité restreinte telle que nous la comprenons aujourd'hui, 
c'est-à-dire au sens d'Einstein, et à mettre en évidence à cet égard l'influence de sa 
pensée de la géométrie sur des problèmes pourtant aussi différents en nature que 
ceux de la mécanique, classique et relativiste. 
 Enfin, quant à l'évolution effective de la pensée d'Einstein sur les 
rapports de la physique et de la géométrie, nous montrons comment elle consiste 
en une adaptation de sa conception implicite lors de l'élaboration de la Relativité 
restreinte aux exigences de la théorie de la Relativité généralisée. Cette adaptation 
lui fit une nécessité de prendre en compte la complexité du problème qu'il avait pu 
(et même dû) simplifier pour la première théorie, lui faisant voir en même temps 
le bien-fondé de certains aspects importants des conceptions de Poincaré, que dès 
lors il traduisit, puis adapta, dans les termes de sa propre pensée de la physique. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
 The advent of General Relativity has been the occasion of a renewal 
of the debate among mathematicians, theoretical physicists and philosophers of 
science, about the relations between Geometry and Physics, with particular 
emphasis to the problem of the possibility of deciding which Geometry is 
appropriate to the representation of physical space. Taking aside the conceptions 
of neo-criticists as expound by Cassirer1 , the two most significant positions 
facing each other were that of logical positivism and empiricism as notably 
represented  by Carnap and Reichenbach2, and that of critical realism and 
rationalism as advocated by Einstein3. In essence, the arguments were partly 
borrowed from those which arose when non-euclidean geometries came to the 
forefront in the field of mathematics, being adapted and somewhat modified to 
take into account the kind of evidence for the physical concern of non-euclidean 
geometries which originated from General Relativity. 
 According to the theory of General Relativity, the dynamics of the 
gravitation field is brought by the geometrical structure of physical space. General 
Relativity thus appeared as that theory which made possible to  decide, from its 
experimental tests, what is the geometry of space. In the opinion of many, this 
entailed the strongest refutation of kantian synthetic a priori ; logical positivists 
and empiricists concluded from it to empiricism as the only possible philosophy 
henceafter, which they identifed as precisely that philosophy compulsorily 
required by the theory of Relativity, and more generally by contemporary Physics 
(and science)4. 
 On this philosophical background, Einstein's position sounds 
somewhat different. He also concluded to the possibility of deciding 
experimentally about the Geometry appropriate to physical space, but denied the 
statements of empiricism, invoking Poincaré's philosophy of Geometry as 
providing decisive arguments in favour of some kind of conventionalism, that 
helped him to advocate, for the interpretation of the relations between Physics and 
Geometry, a philosophical view which we may characterize as critical rationalism 
and realism.  
 Here arises a first historical and epistemological problem, related to 
the more general one of the philosophy that was underlying Einstein's scientific 
achievements in, respectively, Special and General Relativity. The problem to 
which we shall restrict ourselves in this respect through the present paper is that 
                                            
 
1 Cassirer 1921 
2See for instance Carnap 1921, 1924, 1925, Reichenbach 1920, 1922, 1928,1949.  
3 Einstein 1921 b, 1949. See below, and also Paty 1989, and in press. 
4 See the works of Schlick (1917, 1921 a, 1922), and those already quoted of 
Reichenbach and Carnap. 
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of his conceptions of the relation between Geometry and Physics at these two 
stages of his scientific work. He stated explicitely his philosophy of these 
relations after having elaborated the General Theory of Relativity ; and, as it is 
well known, he got interested in non-euclidean Geometries when he needed them 
to formulate this theory. The case of Special Relativity is not so clear, for he did 
not use indeed those Geometries, nor did he mention that there was eventually a 
problem of the relationship of Geometry and Physics when he was re-defining the 
concept of space (and time). But, indeed, in such a re-casting from newtonian 
concepts, an implicit conception of this relationship was at work. This leads us 
directly to his separation of kinematics from dynamics which is at the heart of 
Special Relativity. An important feature of Poincaré's own approach to the 
electrodynamics of moving bodies and to Relativity is, on the opposite, the strong 
linking of relative physical space and time (considered separately one from each 
other) with dynamics. We are thus led again to Poincaré's conceptions about space 
and about Geometry, this time ‘à propos’ of Special Relativity.  
 Our first problem can then be formulated as follows : did Einstein's 
thought about space (and time) and about Geometry evoluate from an absence of 
concern for Geometry and a separation between space and dynamics, which would 
be typical of his path to Special Relativity, towards an almost complete alinement 
on Poincaré's conception of Geometry and of dynamical space (and time), 
occasioned by his work on General Relativity ? 
 A second epistemological and historical problem thus comes on the 
forefront, and it in fact is twofold : did Poincaré actually thought that Geometry 
and Physics are indissociable in the way that has been generally considered after 
the establishment of General Relativity, by logical positivists and empiricists and 
by Einstein as well ? i.e., in essence, on the same ground as his indissociability of 
space and dynamics, the first one being but a reflexion of the last one ? And, as a 
kind of a corollary : did Poincaré's philosophy of Geometry have an effect on his 
own approach to Relativity, by which, although he developped the right behaviour 
of relativistic space and time (in the sense of Special Relativity), he insisted on 
maintaining the classical and absolute ones as well ? 
 We shall begin by recalling briefly Einstein's conception of physical 
Geometry and his call to Poincaré's views in his claim for the non empiricist 
character of the decision for a Geometry from experiment. Then we shall turn to 
Poincaré's true position about the so-called "indissociability of Geometry and 
Physics". Next, we shall inquire his approach to relativistic Mechanics through 
the point of view of his philosophy of Geometry. Finally we shall come back to 
Einstein and examine his exact conception of the use of Geometry in Physics at 
the time of the Special Theory of Relativity. 
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2. EINSTEIN'S PHYSICAL GEOMETRY AND HIS REFERENCE TO POINCARE. 
 Almost immediately after having fully developed his theory of 
General Relativity, Einstein was led to expound his views on the relationship of 
Geometry and Physics, in order to make understand that fundamental property of 
the theory which relates the space-time metrics and the gravitation field. We shall 
come back in the last section of this paper to some aspects of the circumstances of 
his own commitment with the question of Geometry, occasioned by his approach 
of the generalization of the relativity principle from inertial to accelerated 
motions, which he had related through the principle of equivalence (of inertial and 
gravitational masses) with the properties of gravitation. At that stage, we shall 
also inquire further about the deep roots of his conception of what he called 
"physical Geometry", or "practical Geometry". Let us, for the moment, summarize 
the essential  of this conception, as it is when he stated it that Einstein called for 
Poincaré's philosophy of Geometry, on which, so he claimed, his own view was 
partially based5. 
 "Physical Geometry", or equivalently "practical Geometry", is  defined 
by him from pure, mathematical, or "axiomatic Geometry", by "adding to it", or 
"completing it with", relations of coordination that relate geometrical quantities 
(such as, for example, distance) to corresponding quantities considered for 
"practically rigid" bodies.  The practical Geometry thus constructed, through the 
"interpretation" of mathematical (geometrical) quantities applied to these abstract 
and idealized objects is, for Einstein, a kind of a physical theory (and indeed, he 
said, it has been the oldest branch of physics).  It is the theory of an idealized 
physical space, which he liked to call "space of reference", constructed from an 
abstraction and simplification of physical bodies, these being reduced to the 
consideration of their spatial properties only and extended by thought to build a 
space.  
 The concept of "body of reference", or of "space of reference" 
(abstracted from the latter), is so to speak a kind of an intermediate between the 
purely abstract space of mathematical Geometry (which is devoid of any 
connexion with the material world) and material bodies which are the objects of 
our experience. It is this "space of reference" that determines practical or physical 
Geometry as the theory  of that space.  Let us observe that this object and this 
theory are (abstract) constructions of the mind aimed at the description of some 
aspects of physical reality (namely, the purely spatial properties of bodies); they 
are not different, in this respect, from any other physical object or theory. From 
this, Einstein's answer to the question of the experimental decidability of the 
Geometry of the physical world does not differ from his answer to the question of 
the relations between theory and experiment in Physics. Experiment helps in 
choosing among various theories, but is in no way the only element of our 
decision. His critical rationalism and realism was at variance with empiricism, 
                                            
5 Einstein 1921 a, d, 1926, 1949, 1954, etc.  
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even in its more sophisticated logical version6. 
 When advocating this conception, Einstein quoted Poincaré's 
statements about the impossibility of any compulsory decision from experiment 
about the nature of the Geometry. Whatever be the results of our experiments with 
physical bodies, so Poincaré said, we shall always be free to choose euclidean or 
any non euclidean Geometry (and, if we want so, to keep euclidean Geometry). 
Einstein rightly recalled the first consideration which led Poincaré to this 
conclusion : Geometry in itself, as a mathematical theory, says nothing about 
physical space or bodies. Then, at the same time he expounded his conception of 
"practical" or "physical" Geometry", Einstein mentioned a second consideration 
referred to Poincaré, which he described as the "indissociability of Geometry and 
Physics"7, from which it will never be possible to decide from physical 
experiments for a Geometry appropriate to the physical world, as we can always 
choose a modification of Physics rather than of Geometry.  
 Such has been, since Einstein's 1921 paper "Geometry and 
experience", the interpretation of Poincaré's conception commonly taken for 
granted in the debate which opposed the various currents in philosophy of science 
(neo-criticists, logical empiricists, critical realists and rationalists). For his part, 
Einstein used this conventionalist argument as an evidence in favour of the 
rational aspect of the problem, opposed to the idea of a purely empirical 
conclusion. But he departed from Poincaré's strictly conventionalist position, by 
stating that we finally conclude as to the nature of the appropriate Geometry, 
through the choice of an approximation which makes us dissociate in pratice those 
elements that were indissociable in principle. 
 It is useful to consider in more details Einstein's use of the alleged 
Poincaré's argument. Poincaré stated, recalled Einstein, that there is no such a 
thing, in nature, as perfect rigid bodies, bodies being always affected by physical 
properties such as temperature, electric and magnetic quantities, etc., which 
modify their geometrical behaviour. Thus it is not Geometry alone that provides 
statements on the behaviour of real objects, but Geometry (G) combined with the 
whole of physical laws (P) : "It is the sum (G) + (P) alone which is submitted to 
the control of experiment. One can consequently choose (G) arbitrarily, and parts 
of (P) as well : all these laws are  conventions. (…) With this conception, 
axiomatical Geometry and those laws of nature to which the character of 
conventions is attributed appear, from the epistemological point of view, as being 
of an equal value". Concluding his evocation of this alleged point of view, 
Einstein gives the following appreciation : "Sub specie aeterni Poincaré's 
conception is in my opinion correct", emphasizing that actually, there does not 
exist, in the real world, objects corresponding exactly to the ideal standard objects 
                                            
6 Paty 1989, and in press.  
7 Einstein 1921 a 
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of Geometry8.  
 Another formulation of the conception of the indissociability of 
Geometry and Physics as attributed to Poincaré can be found in Einstein's 1949 
"Reply to criticism", where he argues against Reichenbach, invoking Poincaré's 
argument that "verification (…) refers  (…) not merely to Geometry but to the 
entire system of physical laws which constitute its foundation. An examination of 
geometry by itself is consequently not thinkable". As a conclusion we can choose 
that Geometry which is most convenient to us (i.e., euclidean Geometry) and fit 
the remaining physical laws in such a way as to obtain agreement with 
experiment9. 
 Actually this is not exactly Poincaré's point of view, but a translation 
of it made by Einstein in his own perspective, that is according to his conception 
of physical Geometry. For, in Poincaré's conception, Geometry enters in the 
considerations of Physics only through definitions and is not on an equal footing 
with it. The argument about physical properties of rigid bodies was used by 
Poincaré only with respect to the question of relativity of space, and of the 
possibility to obtain evidence for it by measuring bodies. When Poincaré made 
use of the concept of standard object, idealized as it may be, he was not 
considering Geometry but Physics (to him, the relativity of space is a physical 
property which bodies ought to observe through their positions and directions). As 
for Einstein, when he is referring to standard objects, he is considering ‘practical’ 
or ‘physical’ Geometry itself, and not any more the axiomatical one. But such an 
idea was alien to Poincaré. We shall see from his texts that Poincaré never related 
the consideration of the physical properties of bodies to a combination of 
Geometry and Physics considered in that way. 
 Einstein's reasoning about the indissociability between Geometry and 
Physics, which started from the difference between purely mathematical, 
axiomatic, Geometry, and practical Geometry  applied to physical situations, and 
considered the first with respect to Poincaré's conception, was as a matter of fact 
shifted from axiomatic to physical Geometry.  We actually get, in Einstein's 
description of the problem, Gpr + P, and not G + P, Gpr standing for practical 
Geometry, and being defined as Geometry G endowed with relations of 
coordination and congruence between its mathematical concepts and idealized 
physical objects, such as to define for the latter the notion of distance. Practical 
Geometry, Gpr, is, as we said earlier, nothing but a theory of the (idealized) 
physical space obtained through the idealization of physical bodies, i.e. the theory 
of distances for physical bodies, as thought independently from other physical 
properties. As such, Gpr is a part of Physics, which we could as well designate by 
Pd (i.e., Physics of distances), if we were to emphasize its relation with the rest of 
                                            
8 Einstein 1921 d. 
9 Einstein 1949, p. 677. 
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physics, Pp, (Physics of other, physical, properties), Physics as a whole being  P = 
Pd + Pp, which is clearly indissociable in principle (and which could be better 
symbolized by  Pd x Pp). 
 Einstein's conception of physical Geometry, to which we shall come 
back later on, has borrowed from Poincaré something of his conventionalism but 
in a way which has modified Poincaré's conception stricto sensu. Einstein's 
purpose was indeed to oppose this part of conventionalism, which was in his view 
also a claim for rationalism,  to empiricism, which considered that physical 
Geometry can be directly inferred from experiment. 
 In his translation of Poincaré's position, to which we shall turn now, 
Einstein was possibly influenced by considerations made by Schlick in his 1917 
book on the theory of Relativity, concerning Poincaré's conception of the 
relativity of space10. Schlick recalled Poincarés consideration of a general 
modification of spatial dimensions of bodies occurring in a given universe, such 
that we would have no means of being aware of it, as everything in this universe 
would have its dimensions modified in the same way ; and he added to it a 
corresponding physical transformation affecting the properties of really physical 
bodies, in such a way that the conclusion is the same, but based, this time, on a 
more plausible situation from the physical point of view. Schlick then spoke about 
the indissociability of Geometry and Physics, referring it to Poincaré's 
argumentation. 
 
 
3. POINCARE'S TRUE CONCEPTION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN GEOMETRY AND 
PHYSICS. 
 Poincaré's philosophy of Geometry11 as he expounded it in particular 
in his famous 1891 and 1895 papers which constitute two chapters of La Science 
et l'hypothèse, is related to considerations on the physical world only in so far as it 
shows how the genesis of Geometry is obtained through man's experience of this 
physical world. It is not in these texts, but in later contributions, such as the 
chapter of the same book entitled "Experience and Geometry"12, that he 
expressedly considers the physical character of the objects to which one relates 
Geometry when we wants to submit it to the judgement of experiment.  
                                            
10 Schlick 1917. See Paty (in press, chapter 6). On relativity of space, see 
Poincaré 1898 b, 1903 a, 1907.  
11 Poincaré 1886, 1891, 1892, 1895, 1898 b, 1899, 1902 b, 1903 a, 1907, 1912 a 
and b.  
12 Poincaré 1899, included in chapter 5 of La science et l'hypothèse. 
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 True, his previous considerations of the genesis of Geometry had led 
him to state that "the principles of Geometry are not experimental facts". But only 
in that last writing does he deal in detail with the relation of Geometry, as a 
branch of mathematics, considered as constituted, and not through its genesis, 
with concrete physical objects. He begins by making a radical distinction between 
Geometry considered as an axiomatic science and what is related with practical 
experiment : a distinction which Einstein, to some extent, will make too, but with 
a significant difference in vocabulary. Einstein will differentiate axiomatic 
Geometry, which is purely mathematical, and practical or physical Geometry, 
which is a physical science with a simplified object, i.e. a physical object with 
only geometrical properties13. This apparently slight difference is indeed an 
important one, having to do with the construction of physical theory, be it at the 
elementary level of a theory of the geometrical distances of standard objects 
(measuring rods) or at the more elaborated one of the theory of General Relativity. 
 In Poincaré's view, a fundamental aspect of axiomatic Geometry is 
that it can be integrally translated from a system of axioms and concepts to 
another one, and this property suffers no exception. On the contrary, practical 
experiment considers material objects for which  we must always inquire about 
their relations with ideal notions, such as, for instance, the notion of distance, as 
they never coïncide exactly with them. Reasoning on straight line and distance, he 
infers from this that "it is impossible to imagine a practical experiment which 
could be interpreted in the euclidean system and could not be interpreted in the 
lobachevskian one…".  
 Furthermore, considering a physical system with respect to the 
question of Geometry entails considering the physical state of the bodies which 
constitute that system (i.e. temperature, electric quantities and so forth), the 
relative position of those bodies (they are defined from their mutual distances), as 
well as their absolute position and orientation in space. Poincaré's reasoning is 
actually directed toward the question of relativity of space, namely whether this 
one is maintained when we perform measurements of distances between bodies 
and express their results in terms of one Geometry or another. His conclusion is 
that we never can get outside of a given interpretative frame : "If the law is true in 
euclidean interpretation, it ought to be true also in the non-euclidean one". This 
conclusion meets with what he had inferred from his previous considerations 
about the genesis of Geometry : as a matter of fact, "experiments brings only 
knowledge of the mutual relations of bodies ; none of them is, or can be, about the 
relations of bodies with space, or about the mutual relations of the various parts of 
space"14.  
 When we speak of the "geometrical properties of bodies", for 
Poincaré, we can never point at the metrical properties of space, and our 
                                            
13 Einstein 1921 b, 1949.  
14 Poincaré 1902 a, chapter 5.  
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experiments never deal with space, but on bodies. He gives for this statement the 
following illustration : consider solid bodies made of  portions of straight lines 
assembled together, and sets of  points taken on  them and put in relation the ones 
with the others. It is possible to  arange the relative positions of points and rods in 
such a way that the motion of the body obeys euclidean group ; or that, on the 
contrary, with a different arrangement, it obeys lobachevskian group. We 
obviously will not conclude from it that these experiments have shown that space 
is euclidean or lobachevskian. Experiment has been not on space, but on bodies 
considered as mechanical constructions. And Poincaré concludes that our 
constatations on the respective positions of material bodies are independent of the 
metrical properties of space,  and actually can be performed without any notion of 
these properties : our experiments deal  "not on space, but on bodies"15. The so-
called  geometrical properties of bodies are nothing else than our definitions. 
 As a result, Geometry, in Poincaré's conception, is completely 
disconnected from measurable properties of physical bodies. When he used to 
evoke, in his 1895 paper, the relations between rigid bodies and Geometry, it was 
only for the purpose of showing how rigid bodies are at the origin of the 
constitution of Geometry, and there would be no Geometry without their 
existence. But he never intended to consider a direct and quantitative relationship, 
for "the ideal, absolutely invariables solids" of Geometry are only a simplified 
image of natural solids, "very far from them"16.  
 Geometrical space (as distinct from representative space which is the 
space of our sensations)17 and bodies are not of the same nature (the first is an 
object of the understanding, the other ones are empirical objects), and no direct 
relation between them is possible : the concept of congruence applied to the 
correspondence between the figures of Geometry and those of solid bodies, which 
is one of the senses in which Helmholtz used it, would be, considering Poincaré's 
conception, devoid of meaning, and it is only definition which plays a role. 
Indeed, Poincaré never mentioned ‘congruence’ in this sense. When he speaks of 
"congruence", it is always in the sense of the congruence of geometrical figures. 
For instance, in his 1902 article in which he analyzes Hilbert's work On the 
foundations of Geometry, he invokes congruence as characterizing "the 
displacement of an invariable figure"18. 
 For Poincaré, the choice of a given congruence, which corresponds to 
the choice of a given metric, and defines a given geometry, is a matter of 
convention when one wants to apply it to physical space. This ‘conventionality of 
                                            
15 Ibid. Actually this brings us to representative space, which is precisely the 
space of our sensorial experience. 
161 Poincaré 1895.  
17 Poincaré 1891, 1895. 
18 Poincaré 1902 b. 
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congruence’ (to use Adolf Grünbaum's word19) entails the possibility to choose 
for physical space the metrics one wants, and to reformulate, according to an 
alternative metric, any physical theory. The choice of an alternative metric is, to 
him, of the same nature as the choice of an alternative system of physical units, 
and one has, for that reason, spoken of a "linguistic interdependance" to 
characterize the interdependence of Physics and  Geometry according to 
Poincaré20. 
 This expression however is misleading, as it seems to consider on an 
equal footing these two sciences, when we know that, in Poincaré's view, 
Geometry, once it has been constituted as a mathematical science, is totally 
independent from Physics (there is no ‘interdependence’, but only a ‘one way 
dependence’, i.e. a dependence of the physical formulation on the geometrical 
definitions).  Indeed,  Grünbaum, who uses the expression, subsequently 
endeavours to show that such an "extreme conventionalism" does not correspond 
to actual Poincaré's position, which he considers to be, on the contrary, that of a 
"qualified geometrical empiricist"21. His thesis is that Poincaré's strong statements 
in favour of conventionalism are context dependent, and that he  exaggerated his 
own position, in order to refute both Russell's and Couturat's neo-kantism and 
Helmholtz empiricism. Re-reading Poincaré in this perspective, Grünbaum 
invokes the latter's use of the expression  "by a series of observations, (…) 
experience has proven to me that [bodies'] movements form an euclidean group, 
(…) without having any preconceived idea concerning metric Geometry"22. He 
sees in it an empiricist uttering about the nature of the geometry of space, wheras 
Poincaré means exactly the contrary, as we have seen, precisely, with the example 
of systems of rods endowed with a mechanical agencement whose motion obeys 
an euclidean or lobachevskian group. Such a behaviour has to do, as Poincaré 
unambiguously describes it, not with the space in which these bodies are located, 
but with the mechanism that relates these bodies between them.  
 Grünbaum's idea, in fact, is that Poincaré's position, for which  
geometries are abstract and without relation with physical facts, are 
"uninterpreted", meets with that of logical empiricism in the claim that the 
question of the truth of Geometry is a matter of coordinative definitions. 
According to Grünbaum, Poincaré's polemics is against the attribution of a factual 
truth to congruence when it is in fact a matter of definition. But this is, actually, 
an interpretation and a reformulation of Poincaré's thought in the terms of a 
philosophy which would come after ; indeed, this later philosophy founded itself 
partly on some of Poincaré's criticism, in particular on those which asked for a 
precise definition of concepts. For Poincaré never spoke of "interpreted 
                                            
19 Grünbaum 1963, ed. 1973, p. 119.  
20 Grünbaum 1963, ibid., p. 119. 
21 Ibid., p. 129. Emphasis is Grünbaum's. 
22 Poincaré 1902 b. Emphasis is Grünbaum's in quoting Poincaré. 
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geometry", nor of congruence related to definitions of coordination : such 
conceptions were alien to it. 
 In his 1912 text "Space and time"23, in which he indicates how one 
defines space from the consideration of bodies, these last ones being submitted to 
the "principle of  physical relativity", Poincaré speaks indeed of the transport of a 
solid body on another one, of application of a solid body on a figure, by which 
one can define by convention the equality of figures, from which Geometry is 
born. But this ‘congruence’ (a word he does not use here) is referred only to 
bodies between them, or to bodies with figures that are images of these bodies, 
and not  between bodies on one side and geometrical quantities on the other. 
Poincaré recalls in this writing that Geometry, born from these considerations, is 
the study of the structure of the group formed by spatial transformations, i.e. the 
group of displacements of solid bodies : it still has not become a ‘science of 
space’. He insisted again on the difference between Physics and Geometry on 
evoking the "principle of physical relativity", seing in the latter "an  experimental 
fact" which entails the possibility of its revision, when, on the contrary, 
"Geometry must be immune from such a revision". (To preserve Geometry from 
revision, one must raise the principle of relativity to the rank of a reasonable 
convention). Let us observe en passant that if, relatively to physics, Poincaré 
holds indeed an empiricism mixed with conventionalism (which, as an effect, 
bestows him on that point some kinship with logical empiricism), his position 
relatively to Geometry is quite different. 
 Geometry, according to Poincaré, does not for all that identify itself 
exactly with "axiomatical Geometry", to which Einstein will refer in his 
conference on "Geometry and experiment", considering besides it a "physical 
Geometry", as in Riemann and in Helmholtz. Poincaré does not consider a 
"physical Geometry", but only Geometry under its mathematical aspect. But, to 
him, even purely mathematical, Geometry maintains something which is related to 
its origin, to the operation of the understanding which generated it, and finally to 
these bodies whose displacement gives rise to the study of their groups, this study 
being properly the object of Geometry. We can at least interprete in this way his 
dissatisfaction of the axiomatic definition of Geometry as proposed by Hilbert, 
when he points out - as we recalled it earlier - that this definition does not refer to 
the "natural concept" of congruence of figures in their displacement, which is, 
indeed, the intuitive image of the congruence of bodies. Axiomatic thus fails to  
get its postulates back "to their true psychological origin"24. 
 Geometry, if we look carefully at Poincaré's argumentation, is used in 
our description of the physical properties of bodies, only as a definition (and this 
extends his conception of the axioms of Geometry, which "are nothing else than 
                                            
23 Poincaré 1912 b.  
24 Poincaré 1902 b. On the importance of the notion of displacement of figures in 
Poincaré, see Vuillemin 1973. 
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disguised définitions"25).  
 All what we have said about the difference of status between 
Geometry and Physics is well confirmed by the clear difference Poincaré 
establishes between a purely (mathematical) science as  Geometry and a (physical) 
science which is as well theoretical as well as experimental as Mechanics26. At 
variance from Geometry, which can and must be thought independently from its 
origin and from experiment, the theoretical part of Mechanics, "conventional 
mechanics" (that of general principles), cannot be separated from "experimental 
mechanics " without mutilation : for "what will remain of conventional mechanics 
when it will be isolated will amount to very little, and will be in no way 
comparable to that splendid system of tenet [corps de doctrine] which we call 
Geometry"27. 
 Poincaré was indeed far from expressing the idea that, with regard to 
experiment, we shall never consider Geometry (G) alone, but always Geometry 
combined with Physics of bodies (P), i.e. the indissociable pair (G + P)  : what 
can be empirically tested, for Poincaré, is simply physics (P)28. We must 
nevertheless observe that, if it has been possible to  afford to Poincaré the idea of 
indissociability of Geometry and Physics in relation with decision from 
experiment, it is because of his conception, relative to bodies and to physical 
systems, of the association of the properties of spatial quantities (related with  
positions and directions, and which we express as geometrical properties) and 
physical properties properly speaking (those of states, internal to, and 
characterizing, physical systems, and they include dynamics). This conception lent 
itself to the above interpretation, but in the very peculiar way to which we are 
                                            
25 Poincaré 1891, in 1902 a, p. 76. 
26 Poincaré 1902 a, p. 152-153. 
27 Ibid. 
28 This difference of status between Geometry and Physics in Poincaré's 
conception forbids to reduce his conclusion on the impossibility to decide 
experimentally about Geometry, which is of a logical nature (because of the 
conventional character of axioms), to a mere factual question (that of the practical 
obstacles which  preclude the elimination of the distorsions due to  perturbations) 
as Grünbaum does (Grünbaum 1963, ed. 1973, p. 131). See above. Louis Rougier 
(whom indeed Grünbaum invokes in favour of his thesis) seems also to modify 
Poincaré's conception about Geometry, when he estimates that, for Poincaré, once 
conventions have been adopted, the facts expressed by science are necessarily true 
or false (Rougier 1920, p. 200). But, from what we have discussed, this is not the 
case, actually, for Poincaré, when this science is Geometry. This being said, 
conventions in the other sciences coexist, in Poincaré's thought, with the notion of 
empirical content and with the possibility of  verification, as Rougier rightly 
emphasizes. In physics, Poincaré seems to conciliate conventionalism and 
empiricism, as we said above. 
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turning now.  
 If, for Poincaré, Physics and Geometry have no direct relations which 
would put them on the same level, because of their difference in nature, as we 
have seen, their connexion can only be of definition and of analogy. Analogies led 
to the genesis of Geometry from the experience of physical properties of bodies ; 
definitions are the means of having Geometry entering in Physics. 
 Let us first emphasize again the role of definitions in the association 
of spatial and physical quantities. Poincaré observed, in his writing on 
"Experiment and Geometry"29 that if, in Astronomy, we were to find that the 
parallaxes are larger than a certain limit, i.e. light is not propagating in a straight 
line, we would have the choice between "either to give up euclidean Geometry", 
either to modify the laws of Optics and admit that light does not propagate exactly 
in a straight line. The statement of such an alternative has been read as if 
Geometry and Physics were on the same level in relation with experiment, when, 
on the contrary, the choice which is given to us is nothing more than a choice in 
the definitions of our physical concepts. If "Geometry has nothing to fear from 
new experiments", it is not because of an ‘indissociability of Geometry and 
Optics’, but because we are free to use the geometrical definition which we want 
for the path of a light ray when dealing with Optics.  
 Let us now come to an analogy, which gets at the same time into 
definition, and whose consideration by Poincaré might have been influencial to 
the interpretation of his conception in terms of ‘indissociability’. It is the link he 
seems to establish between Geometry and dynamics, when he gives as an example 
of the sensorial genesis of the abstract representation of space, the case of a world 
consisting of a heated sphere with a given temperature distribution. (The law of 
temperature distribution through the sphere is T = R2 - r2, r  being the distance 
from the center, R the radius of the sphere, T the absolute temperature; the 
dilatation coefficient is proportional to T, and the refraction index varies as 1/T.) 
In such a world, Geometry will be defined as the study of the displacement of 
solid bodies that undergo distorsions according to the difference of temperature 
(differing  from our own definition which, from our experience of our world, is 
the study of invariable solid bodies), and it will be, indeed, hyperbolic 
(lobachevskian) Geometry. The inhabitants of such a world would maintain, when 
brought to our world, their Geometry, and define accordingly in a different way 
their Physics, whereas if we were to come to their world, we would maintain 
euclidean Geometry and consider in Physics thermodynamical changes. 
 We see how Poincaré is concerned, in such an example, essentially by 
the properties of physical space that are indissociably related with the dynamics of 
bodies, Geometry as such being left untouched and kept within the definitions. To 
these definitions, it is the formation of our notions, through an elaboration which 
                                            
29 Poincaré 1902 a, chapter 5. 
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started from common experience, which will be determinant. The theory of 
physical space is Physics and in no way Geometry (which, as we remind, is the 
theory of the displacements of idealized bodies). But we can indeed consider that 
in Physics, for Poincaré, the theory of space (S) is indissociable from the theory of 
the physical properties of bodies, which in fact is Dynamics (D), so that the 
couple S x D  is indissociable. This means that in front of experimental evidence 
for a given S x D  couple, one would be free to choose either to change the 
(physical) theory of space, either the dynamics. But we see that, despite the 
analogy of the conclusions concerning the conventionality of our choices, one 
cannot identify the situation for the S x D  couple with the G x P  one, for S  is not 
identified with G (Geometry is not the theory of space) and, indeed, S x D  
belongs entirely to Physics, P. 
 
 
4. POINCARE'S GEOMETRICAL THOUGHT AND RELATIVISTIC MECHANICS.  
 This last example can serve us as a transition to the question of 
Poincaré's approach to ‘relativistic Mechanics’ through his study of "The 
dynamics of the electron"30, which looks at first sight completely independent 
from his considerations about Geometry. The  concepts of space (and time) and 
their relation to dynamics are at the core of what was to become Relativity, i.e. the 
reformulation of the Electrodynamics of moving bodies. 
 We shall not give here a detailed analysis of the respective paths of 
Poincaré and Einstein towards special Relativity, and in particular of their specific 
concerns with regard to the concepts we just mentioned, and we refer to another 
work31. Let us only recall the main features of their achievements and attitudes in 
this field. 
 Poincaré's and Einstein's respective conceptions about space 
(properties of distances), time (relativity of simultaneity), and on velocity 
(relativistic addition of velocities, the speed of light as a limiting velocity), 
concerning the mathematical formulation and the physical interpretation of these 
concepts as well as their relation to dynamics, were at the same time very close 
and very different.  
 Very close, because both of them came to exactly the same formulae 
of transformation, with an identical interpretation as to the truely physical 
character of the concepts considered in any (inertial) reference frame (i.e., in the 
usual case of two frames in relative motion, the one taken as at rest, and the one in 
                                            
30 Title of his 1905 paper simultaneous to Einstein's one (Poincaré 1905 b and c, 
Einstein 1905). 
31 Paty (in press), with references to the current litterature. 
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motion), and also to the same relativistic form of Maxwell equations and of the 
Lorentz force32. We must add also that Poincaré had (even before Einstein) the 
idea of relativity of simultaneity which he analyzed in 1898 and then in 190433. 
 But their views were very different concerning the theoretical 
meaning of these results, and only Einstein can be credited of having developped 
a theory  of relativity, where the idea of covariance is basic and founding. 
Although the word was coined afterwards, it summarizes indeed the essential of 
Einstein's 1905 theory (and, so to speak, the ‘object’ of this theory) : covariance, 
as the condition put on physical quantities so that the principle of relativity is 
obeyed, entails the Lorentz formulae of transformation through a redefinition of 
space and time, and the covariant form of (electro-)dynamical laws. Poincaré also 
considered covariance, but not as the founding concept. It was entailed from 
Lorentz formulae of transformation, and these were a consequence of 
electrodynamical properties as evidenced experimentally (with a particular 
emphasis on Michelson-Morley experiment, at variance with Einstein)34. The 
concepts of space, and, separately, of time, were given their relativistic form 
through dynamics. There was no relativistic kinematics thought independently 
from dynamics in Poincaré's approach as well as in his later thoughts (and the 
writing of time as an imaginary fourth spatial component, first introduced by him 
in his 1905 paper, and which was to be taken from him by Minkowski, was to him 
a purely formal trick to get invariant quantities). 
 This ‘dynamical’ thought of the concepts of space, time and velocity 
explains in a way the difference of Poincaré's approach from Einstein's reform of 
kinematics. One could however argue that, even with a dynamical origin and 
nature, time and space could be thought in a way similar to that of Relativity in 
Einstein's sense. Indeed, this is the case if we consider not Special, but General 
Relativity : Einstein's redefinition of time and space through metrics when he took 
into account the gravitation field is in continuity with the previous one, which 
appears as a special case with no field. We are thus led to look for another reason 
of the difference between Einstein's and Poincaré's results. Poincaré's geometrical 
thought, although it bears on a quite different object, will help us here to 
understand better his physical thought. 
 Although, when speaking of Poincaré, the G + P and E + D  couples 
cannot be identified, as we have seen, it is possible to see in his conception an 
                                            
32 Lorentz had not got fully covariant equations for electrodynamics, and had not 
the good velocity transformation. As for space and time, his view was different  : 
according to him, the transformed quantities were mathematical fictions, for 
example his "local time" defined in the moving system. Furthermore there was a 
privileged inertial system, the system related with ether, at absolute rest. See Paty 
(1987, in press, and to be published). 
33 Poincaré 1898 a, 1904 a.  
34 Paty (in press). 
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analogy between Geometry on one hand, and Physics on the other, when we have 
to consider different possible representations for them. In Physics, we are left with 
newtonian classical Mechanics on one side, and with relativistic (or, better, in 
Poincaré's terminology, "new" or electromagnetic) Mechanics with its Lorentz 
transformed space and time and its peculiar composition of velocities on the 
other. If we are to deal with problems of law velocity motions, or of celestial 
Mechanics, for which classical Mechanics suffices, we shall be content with this 
description, which is the simplest one and which we are used to in our daily 
world. On the other hand, if we deal with electromagnetic phenomena, or with 
high velocity motions, we shall adopt the "new Mechanics". But the modifications 
entailed by the latter do not oblige us in any way to modify our classical concepts 
for the description of our daily world. These representations are in no way 
absolute, they are relative. Each one is, as a whole, equivalent to the other, as we 
can put in correspondence every concept of the first to every concept of the 
second. So to speak, the classical and the "new" Mechanics are respectively, when 
we consider them according to Poincaré's way of thinking, in a situation similar to 
euclidean Geometry with respect to non euclidean ones. 
 When, precisely, we look at these concepts themselves, we are led to a 
similar conclusion concerning the equivalent reference frames in relative motions. 
Let us make the analogy explicit. Poincaré conceived the relativity of motions in 
the following manner : inside each system of reference in relative motion, one is 
not conscious of the fact that times, lengths, forces or the various electromagnetic 
quantities are not the same as in the other frames. But this does not matter, as 
every system is coherent in itself : physical quantities which can be measured are 
those quantities defined in the system, and no one is truer in one system than in 
the other.  
 Such is in particular the concept of time, and Poincaré wrote, as soon 
as 1898, that "we have not a direct intuition of simultaneity, nor of the equality of 
two durations". He insisted, in this respect, on the psychological analysis of the 
idea of simultaneity, originated from the sensations we receive from events, and 
considered that simultaneity statements are reduced to rules that "make statements 
on natural laws the simpler possible"35. In his 1904 paper, he inquired about the 
physical meaning of Lorentz's local time, and considered the synchronisation of 
distant clocks in a way rather similar to Einstein's 1905 analysis36.  He took first 
the clocks in relative rest, then in relative motion : in the last case, did he notice, 
the synchronisation condition is different from that at rest, for motion alters the 
interval of time needed to transmit optical signals ; the new time, determined by 
taking this into account, equates to Lorentz's local time. And Poincaré concludes : 
"Clocks set up in this way will not show any more the true time, they will show 
what we may call local time, so that one of them will lag behind the other. But it 
matters very little, because we shall have no means to be conscient of it. All 
                                            
35 Poincaré 1898 a. 
36 Poincaré 1904 a. 
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phenomena which will occur in A, for example, will lag behind, but all with the 
same rate, and the observer will not notice it, because his watch is lagging behind 
too; so that, as required by the principle of relativity, there will be no way to know 
whether he is at rest or in motion"37.  
 From this we see clearly that, besides the dynamical origin of time 
considered in a given physical  system, lies a specific conception of what 
"relative" (time, and system) is. It must be added that the principle of relativity for 
physical laws is taken, by Poincaré, in a similar meaning as for space (the 
relativity of space). There is no absolute motion (or time, or space) in the same 
way, and for the same reason, as there is no absolute position and direction38. 
Furthermore, the genesis of the concept of space (from compensations of motions 
by our body and muscles to external motions) implies relativity of motion39. In 
the relativity of systems and motions, Poincaré is content with the consideration 
of any of these systems taken in itself, as a whole, each one being not less and not 
more true than any other. He does not insist about the possibility of passing from 
one to the other, once the general transformation between them is set. He 
considers the relations of different physical quantities inside a system (they have 
the same structure in all systems), and not the relation of a given quantity as taken 
in different systems (except for the establishment of formulas of 
transformation)40, notwithstanding his analysis of simultaneity. These relative 
systems constitute, so to speak, closed worlds endowed with adequate and self-
sufficient representations.  
 This view is analogous to his conception of Geometries. The structure 
of physical quantities in a given system is thought in the same way as the structure 
of geometrical concepts in a given Geometry. And the same is true for the 
concepts of newtonian Mechanics, or for those of the "new Mechanics". Poincaré 
is aware that, if we wish to consider together Mechanics and Electromagnetism, 
one must perform corrections on the quantities of the first one. But this does not 
entail, in his view, a general modification of the laws and concepts, and those of 
Mechanics are still valid in its domain. If he thought so, it well probably is 
because he considered these concepts always through the mediation of dynamical 
laws : he did not admit a representation of physical concepts independent from 
dynamics, or transcendent to it. 
 This structural identity of his argumentation about the concepts in 
Mechanics (and in particular space-time concepts) and about world geometries 
looks obvious if we compare the formulations he gives independently for each 
case. But Poincaré himself gave an indication in favour of such a comparison, 
                                            
37 Poincaré 1904 a (my emphasis, M.P.). 
38  Poincaré 1902 a, chapter 5, p. 98-99, and chapter 7, p. 129. 
39 Poincaré 1895, in 1902 a, p. 83. 
40 If one dares say, this transformation is conceived as a translation, in the 
linguistic sense, more than describing a motion.  
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when he considered on an equal footing, in the chapter on "Classical Mechanics" 
in La science et l'hypothèse,  relativity of space, of time, of simultaneity and the 
variety of possible Geometries. He said that notwithstanding relativity of time one 
continues by convention to speak of absolute time, and that Geometry being a 
convention of language, and letting us free to take it euclidean or non euclidean as 
well, we nevertheless consider it, provisionally,  as euclidean41. 
 In fact, the true key to Poincaré's thought of relativistic Mechanics can 
be found in the identity of the situations one observes, in his descriptions, 
between, on the one hand, in Physics, a system where velocity is given by its 
relativistic formula (and not any more by galilean addition) and, on the other 
hand, in Geometry, the dynamical world represented by a heated sphere. In both 
caes, the structure is given by a hyperbolic relation. Considered from the physical 
point of view, this structure is such that its fundamental quantity has a limiting 
value. In the case of relativistic dynamics, this limiting value is the constant 
velocity of light, c, related, precisely, to the relativistic law of composition of 
velocities (in Poincaré's 1905 work, it was a consequence of the formula, whereas 
in Einstein's one the constancy of c entails the formula). For the dynamical heated 
world, the law of transformation for the lengths (dilatation) is characterized by the 
limiting value of the fundamental quantity, i. e. the absolute zero of temperature. 
 The law of relativistic velocities on one side, the law of change in 
temperature (and of lengths) with distance on the other, are formally analogous. 
The inhabitants of the world with a hyperbolic Geometry are not conscious that 
the laws of their world differ from our world, because their knowledge of 
distances (considered geometrically) is depending on the dynamical law which 
governs these distances. This situation can be transposed without difficulty to the 
‘space of relativistic velocities’. Here also it is dynamics (through Lorentz's local 
time and transformation formulas which, to Poincaré, originate in dynamics) that 
dictates the law of transformation of velocities. But the laws as described by the 
relativistic composition of velocities are not fundamentally different from the 
laws as expressed with galilean addition, in a newtonian world where the constant 
c is taken infinite. (And we nowadays know, indeed, that this is due to the fact 
that such a simple operation as a change of variable, velocity v into rapidity y, 
such that y = sinh v/c, reestablishes for the new variable, rapidity, a law of 
addition : the composition law for velocities v  and w, (v + w)/(1 + vw/c2), reads, 
for the corresponding y and z  rapidities, y + z). In both cases we are facing a 
world which exhibits unusual laws, but which is strictly equivalent to the world of 
our ordinary representation (euclidean for the case of Geometry, newtonian for the 
case of Relativity), and which is translatable into the latter. 
 Having done the comparison just sketched and drawn our conclusion, 
entailed by this comparison, of an identity of structure, in Poincaré's thought, 
between the problem of relativistic representations and that of Geometries, we 
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find a justification of it written in Poincaré's own ink. He wrote, in 1904, after 
considering the peculiarities of electromagnetic dynamics : "From all these 
results, if they were to be confirmed, an entirely new Mechanics would emerge, 
which would be essentially characterized by the fact that no velocity could 
overpass the velocity of light, in the same way as no temperature could fall 
beneath the absolute zero of temperature. For an observer that would be drifted 
along a translation he would not be aware of, no velocity could as well overpass 
the velocity of light ; and this would be a contradiction, if one did not remember 
that this observer would not use the same clocks as an observer at rest, but indeed 
clocks showing the ‘local time’"42.  
 Clearly, temperature law and velocity law are put in parallel, and the 
dynamical character of the first suggests a similar characterization for the second. 
The first underlined expression let us see, here again, that Poincaré is concerned 
by the independence of the descriptions of each reference frame with inertial 
motion. Every observer deals with his own space and time (and physical laws 
related to them), in his own system, and nothing more. According to the principle 
of relativity, there is, for sure, no physical means to decide whether this system is 
in motion. But this would not (and actually does not, even for Poincaré !) forbid 
him to communicate with another system having a different motion (for this is, 
indeed, the paper of transformation laws themselves). As for the word 
"contradiction", which I underlined too, its use by Poincaré to characterize a 
situation where both the motion of translation and the velocity of light are at sake, 
shows how close he was to the problem on which Einstein, for his own part, 
insisted in his 1905 Relativity paper, namely the difficulty to reconcile the 
principle of relativity and the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light43. 
 When reading this excerpt, we have only to remember his 1895 article 
on "Space and geometry", to get into the analogy between the thermodynamical 
world and the world (or system) of relativistic velocities. Indeed, the heated world 
is a ‘relativistic world’ in the following sense : if, in the description of this world, 
one replaces absolute temperature (which varies from 0 to infinity) by velocity 
(which varies from c to 0), one obtains a space (in fact a space-time, with a four-
coordinate r) where lengths do contract (and time is determined as local time) as a 
function of the value of the velocity considered. We see how these two 
independent situations are similar. This sheds light on Poincaré's thought about 
Relativity : it is structured identically to his thought of Geometry. 
 Let us summarize. On the one hand, for Poincaré, time and distances 
considered independently each on its side, are made physical trough their 
implication in dynamics ; the link they are keeping between them is mediated 
through the link that each one is keeping with dynamics. This is the reason why 
Poincaré thought them separately, as in their classical acception, so that there does 
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43 See Paty (in press). 
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not exist such a thing as a ‘Poincaré's space-time’, although it was Poincaré who 
introduced the symbolization of time as the fourth spatial dimension, which 
Minkowski was to systematize after him44. Each definition of space and time is 
relative to a self-consistent dynamical representation, like a world representation. 
 On the other hand, the modification undergone by Mechanics, and 
particularly by these spatial and temporal quantities, is analogous to the necessity 
of considering, beside euclidean Geometry, non euclidean ones. It corresponds to 
introducing a new representation which is effective for electromagnetic 
phenomena and for high velocity motions, but free from any claim to be universal. 
In Poincaré's view, various theoretical representations may coexist in Physics, and 
for each class of phenomena one is bound to choose the simplest and the most 
convenient one. Furthermore, the properties of space and time, in so far as they 
are physical quantities, are not objects of Geometry, but of Physics, and are 
especially related with dynamics. 
 Although Poincaré's work in Physics was the work of a theoretical  
physicist properly speaking (in contradistinction with physico- mathematician, 
whose interest is essentially formalization), and notwithstanding our last remark, 
on the dissociation of physical space and Geometry, we can tentatively conclude 
this analysis by saying, without exaggeration, that his interpretation of time and 
space of Relativity was governed by his thought of Geometry. 
 
 
5. AN INTERPRETATION OF EINSTEIN'S EVOLUTION CONCERNING THE RELATION 
BETWEEN GEOMETRY AND PHYSICS. 
 We are thus left with the last problem we wanted to consider : the 
comparison of Einstein's thought about the relations between Geometry and 
Physics, and between space and dynamics, before and after the general Theory of 
Relativity.  
 The last step of Einstein's path towards the General Theory of 
Relativity has been when he realized that it would be impossible to generalize the 
principle of relativity from inertial to accelerated motions unless one drops 
                                            
44 He actually expressed it through the invariant s2 = x2+ y2 + z2- t2, where he 
choose the unities such as c = 1 (Poincaré 1905 b, p. 146).  In the last part of his 
1905 paper, devoted to gravitation, he wrote explicitly  x = t  √-1, and spoke of 
"four dimension space", stating that "Lorentz transformation is nothing else than a 
rotation of that space around the origin" (ibid, p. 168). Let us recall that we also 
owe to Poincaré the first formulation of the method of the search for invariants of 
the Lorentz group, in order to obtain restrictions on the possible forms of an 
interaction (gravitation in this case, ibid.). 
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euclidean Geometry, and, with it, a direct physical meaning attributed to 
coordinates in a reference frame. This idea came to him from a meditation of the 
problem of the behaviour of rigid bodies and rods under Lorentz contraction when 
circular motions are considered.   
  Ehrenfest's paradox45 had shown that rigidity cannot be maintained in 
the usual sense, as a rotating body, which would be rigid in its own system of 
reference, as advocated by Max Born46, ought to be deformed when seen from the 
system taken at rest, due to the fact that Lorentz contraction acts tangentially and 
does not act radially. Such a deformation ought to be the effect of  physical forces, 
as shown by Max Planck and Max von Laue47 :  accelerated motion would result 
in a deformation of the body, which would not be any more rigid, but at least 
elastically deformable, or eventually worn into pieces. At that stage, such a 
dynamical property of rotating bodies entailed, considered from Einstein's point of 
view48, the impossibility of a generalisation of the relativity principle to all kinds 
of motions, including accelerations. 
 Einstein got his solution when he came to consider that relative 
accelerated motions require "another definition of the physical meaning of lengths 
and times". In his 1916 article on General Relativity49, Einstein evokes the case of 
a rotating disk, and gives an interpretation of the difference of the tangential 
contraction and radial invariance in terms not of dynamical properties of the 
‘rigid’ body (which had been the way Born considered it), but of geometrical 
properties of the reference space (when seen from the system at rest, the ratio 
circumference/diameter for the rotating disk was less than ). These geometrical 
properties of the reference frame were not for all that less physical. Such a shift in 
the description of the problem (which he repeated in all his further writings on the 
subject) is meaningful. For Einstein overcame the difficulty he met to extend the 
principle of relativity to accelerated motions by pointing out what he called a 
"limitation of the concept of rigid rods (and clocks)", through the use of gaussian 
coordinates for the description of the space-time continuum. In gravitation fields 
there do not exist such things as "rigid bodies having euclidean properties" and we 
are compelled to use non rigid bodies of reference.  
 If he expressed the problem in such terms, i. e. in terms of a critique 
of euclidean Geometry, and not in terms of a dynamical structure, it is because he 
had previously a strong and definite idea of the physical meaning of distances 
                                            
45Ehrenfest 1908, 1909, following considerations about the truely physical 
character of Lorentz contraction, Ehrenfest 1907, Einstein 1907. See Klein 1970, 
Pais 1981, Stachel 1980, Dieks 1990. 
46 Born 1909, 1910, 1911. 
47 Planck 1910, von Laüe 1911; the problem is  evoked also in Einstein 1911. 
48 As he explained it in his retrospective accounts. 
49 Einstein 1916. See also Einstein 1917, 1921 a. 
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(and durations), which he in fact adquired already when he defined these concepts 
for Special Relativity50. This conception which he did put in practice in his 
considerations on the transformations of reference frames in motion, made itself 
explicit with reference to Geometry thereafter. In his further descriptions of 
Special Relativity he then would always give at the start definitions referred to 
Geometry, and use to retrospectively read Special Relativity in such a way. In his 
first book of popularization, published already in 1917, The Special and General 
Theory of Relativity51, the first chapter is entitled, precisely, "The physical content 
of geometrical statements". In other important works he would further develop his 
analyses of what appears to be, precisely, the relationship of Geometry and 
Physics, which we have sumarized before52. 
 Clearly, Einstein's notion of "physical Geometry" is inherited from 
Helmholtz who coined the term53. But, this concept, such as he made it explicit 
with General Relativity, is directly inspired also by Riemann whose conception of 
Geometry appealed directly to Physics : it is the last one that provides the metrics, 
i.e. the proper Geometry for physical space, as Geometry has become, with 
Riemann, the "science of space", and no more the "science of figures in space" it 
was before54. Interestingly enough, when Einstein explains the relation of 
Geometry with the spatial properties of bodies, he generally prefers to use the 
expression "practical Geometry" rather than "physical Geometry". His "practical 
Geometry" is in fact the same as Helmholtz's "physical Geometry", being defined 
from purely mathematical Geometry (axiomatic Geometry, for Einstein) by 
"adding to it", or "completing it with", relations of coordination that relate 
geometrical quantities (such as, for example, distance) to corresponding quantities 
considered for "practically rigid" bodies. "Practical Geometry" is applicable to the 
spatial considerations of both Relativities, the Special and the General ones. 
Perhaps in his view the use of the expression "Physical Geometry" would better 
describe the theory of physical space in the General Theory, as we are there in a 
situation closer to Riemann's conception, with a deeper connection between 
Geometry and Physics. Anyway, Einstein did not state it ; and we shall content 
ourselves in observing that this "practical" concern results in defining a theory of 
an abstract and simplified object ("space of reference").  
 The concept of "body of reference" is pregnant in Einstein's thought 
through all his path since Special Relativity up to General Relativity. Even his 
emphasis on inertia, when he defined the relativity principle, expresses nothing 
                                            
50 Einstein 1905. See our more detailed work on this and other Einstein's 
achievements : Paty (in press).  
51 Einstein 1917. 
52 Einstein 1921 a, b, 1926, 1949 c, 1954, etc. 
53 Helmholtz 1868, 1870. 
54 This suggestive opposition of the two objects of Geometry has been proposed 
by Ch. Houzel (Houzel 1989 a and b).  See also Boi (1989). 
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but a property of the systems of reference that are admissible55. (On the contrary, 
Poincaré did not restrict so clearly his statements on the "principle of relativity" to 
inertial systems, the restriction being always considered a practical one, an effect 
of an approximation56). It thus appears that Geometry, as euclidean Geometry, 
was in fact implicated right at the beginning in Einstein's work, since the 
considerations about rods and clocks of Einstein's 1905 paper, in the terms of an 
embedding of Geometry (that of bodies of reference) and Physics. 
 When he justifies, for instance in his 1921 Princeton lectures, the 
abstract construction of four-dimensional space-time, Einstein argues that the 
three-dimensional euclidean space of pre-relativistic physics was the result of an 
abstract elaboration as well, referring to Poincaré's considerations in La science et 
l'hypothèse on the foundations of Geometry from the study of displacements of 
bodies based on our own body's experience. At variance with Poincaré, Einstein 
expresses this construction of our geometrical notions in terms of a "space of 
reference", which is an abstraction constructed from bodies. Such a concept, 
absent in Poincaré, who used to speak only of the motions of bodies (be them 
idealized), is a kind of an intermediate between the purely abstract space of 
mathematical Geometry and material bodies which are the objects of our 
experience. It is this "space of reference" that determines practical or physical 
Geometry as the theory ofthat space. Let us note that, from this point of view, it 
corresponds to a riemannian conception of Geometry as theory of space, which 
Helmholtz as well as Poincaré did not share, each one for different reasons. 
 We are able to see that Einstein's own elaboration of these concepts 
(space of reference, practical or physical Geometry), is a genuine one which 
borrows elements from Riemann, Helmholtz and Poincaré, and is not an 
alinement on Poincaré's philosophy of Geometry. Furthermore, this elaboration 
shows its ability to integrate the conceptions on space, and implicitly on 
Geometry, that Einstein did put in practice before his General Relativity, and 
which indeed conditioned already the Special Theory and his particular approach 
to the problem of the physical meaning of space (and time) coordinates. Thus, his 
separation of kinematics from dynamics in the Special Relativity appears as a 
simplification which was legitimated by the purpose he had in mind at that time, 
and which can be described as an approach to the theory conceived as determined 
strictly by the consideration of its object. (This type of approach being 
characteristic of Einstein's ‘scientific style’.) And we recall that this object was, to 
summarize, covariance in the sense of inertial transformations, and in no way 
dynamical properties of physical systems (what it was for Poincaré57. When the 
object aimed at will be changed, i.e. when covariance will be taken in the general 
sense, and the problem will show itself to be of a dynamical nature, this 
                                            
55 Einstein 1917, chapter 4. 
56 See for instance Poincaré 1912 a. 
57 Paty (in press). 
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simplification will not be held anymore. We cannot help to make the diagnosis of 
a deep continuity in Einstein's path and thought in the field of Relativity and 
concerning Geometry, despite the strong differences which we recalled at the 
beginning. 
 It thus appears from the comparative examination of Poincaré's and 
Einstein's contributions to the Special Theory of Relativity, that, for both of them, 
their respective ways towards Relativity was strongly influenced by their 
conceptions concerning the relation between Mathematics, and in particular 
Geometry, and Physics. But although Poincaré thought Physics with his 
geometer's mind, Einstein thought Geometry trough its use in buiding Physics, a 
view that he would maintain and refine afterward. 
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